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1 Introduction
To ‘combine general relativity and quantum mechanics’—as the issue of quan-
tum gravity (QG) is frequently summarized—is typically understood to be the
central challenge for fundamental physics. The common conviction is that
this quest for QG is not only fuelled, but generated by external principles
(cf. Mattingly (2005) and Wu¨thrich (2006, 2012)). Accordingly, the rese-
arch program of QG is believed to be driven, first and foremost, by reasoning
involving philosophical assumptions. It is suspected that specifically approa-
ches in the context of particle physics are essentially based on, for example,
metaphysical premises rather than experimental data or physical arguments. I
disagree. In fact, it is exactly Weinberg’s and others’ particle physics stance
that reveals the issue of QG as a genuine physical problem arising within the
framework of quantum field theory (QFT).
In this paper, I argue that the quest for QG sets an important and often mis-
conceived example of physics’ internal unificatory practice. Physics’ internal
strategies, e.g. exploiting the explanatory capacities of an established theory,
suffice to explain the search for a theory of quantum gravity. To set the stage,
I will first recap what the research program of QG is about and what remarks
suspecting a ‘dogma of unification’ amount to. To support my claim, I will
then investigate the spin-2 approach to the matter focussing on Weinberg’s
quantum field theoretic reconstruction of Einsteins principle of equivalence.
Subsequently, two important consequences for our understanding of general
relativity (GR) and the issue of QG are briefly discussed: First, it is suggested
that we should not take GR as a fundamental theory because it can be reduced
1I thank Andreas Bartels, Cord Friebe, Stefan Heidl, Niels Linnemann, James Read, Mat-
thias Rolffs, Thorsten Schimannek, and Christian Wu¨thrich for helpful discussions and re-
marks. Furthermore, I thank the anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify some para-
graphs, especially in the opening sections.
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to QFT. Second, the investigation serves as a clarification of what the pro-
blem with QG actually is. Afterwards, some objections against the advocated
picture are mentioned and very briefly replied to. Finally, I will revisit the
opening question concerning the alleged ‘dogma of unification’.
2 Some Remarks on Quantum Gravity
Fundamental physics is based on two theories, the standard model of parti-
cle physics (SM)2 and the general theory of relativity (GR). While the first
describes the electromagnetic, the weak and the strong interaction of suba-
tomic matter particles as well as the Higgs mechanism in a quantum field
theoretic framework, the latter addresses the fourth fundamental interaction,
i.e. gravity, in terms of a classical field theory. To reconcile these basic pillars
within one framework uncovering their common ground or, more specifically,
finding a quantum theory of gravitation or an even richer all-encompassing
theory comprising it (e.g. string theory), is frequently understood to be the
central challenge for contemporary physics.
Such reconciliations do not necessarily result in a particularly substantial
type of unification. One might simply be concerned with issues of consistency
or some law-like connection. For instance, as a first attempt, one could merely
try to merge or couple classical GR and QFT without further modifications
to form so-called semi-classical theories (e.g. Carlip (2008)). While such
theories acknowledge that according to quantum theory the matter fields are
fundamentally quantum theoretic structures, they insist that gravitation, i.e.
spacetime, is fundamentally classical (‘non-quantum’). Accordingly, a simple
semi-classical theory rewrites Einstein’s equations as:
Gab = 8pi〈Tab〉 . (2.1)
Here, the matter fields are introduced by the expectation value of the stress
energy tensor, 〈Tab〉. However, despite some convenient properties according
to the Ehrenfest theorem that links the quantum mechanical expectation value
to Newton’s classical equations of motion, the expectation value is not a fully
classical object. Therefore, it gives rise to problematic discontinuities as many
have pointed out (e.g. (Eppley and Hannah , 1977); see also Wald (1984) and
Kiefer (2007)). As a result, most physicists typically do not seriously consider
semi-classical theories. It should be noted though that some have criticized
these objections against semi-classical theories as not compelling (cf. Huggett
and Callender (2001a,b), Mattingly (2005, 2006), Wu¨thrich (2005)). So,
technically semi-classical theories may not be ruled out yet.
2I do not distinguish between ‘theory’ and ‘model (of a theory)’ here. More accurately, one
would refer to the SM as a ‘model (of QFT)’.
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Still, what is typically understood by ‘quantum gravity’ is a more sub-
stantial reconciliation in terms of some sort of quantization of gravity (e.g.
Huggett and Callender (2001a,b), and Wu¨thrich (2005)). To ‘quantize’ a
classical theory means to construct a quantum theory whose classical limit
agrees with the classical theory. Note that quantization does not necessarily
imply discreteness. For instance, in the case of quantum mechanics (QM)
some observables did become discrete after quantization, but others like po-
sition and momentum operators did not. Accordingly, to quantize GR does
not imply discreteness of spacetime. Making spacetime discrete is merely
one possibility—and it is a possibility that comes with a cost as it actually
compromises an important symmetry of physics: Lorentz-invariance.
Now, there are many different approaches to QG of this more substantial
kind. According to Kiefer (2007) they may be grouped into primary and se-
condary theories of quantum gravity. The former employ standard procedures
of quantization (canonical or covariant quantization) as it has been done in the
case of quantum electrodynamics, for example. The latter comprise QG as a
limit of some fundamental quantum theoretic framework, e.g. string theory.
Note that this classification is based on how the approaches proceed. Syste-
matically the respective approaches may nonetheless be related. For instance,
Weinberg (1999) emphasizes a relation between quantum field theoretic, i.e.
covariant, approaches and string theory.
But why should we seek a quantum theory of gravity at all? Usually,
theoretical considerations are understood to indicate an incompleteness of
present-day physics related to the issue of QG (e.g. Kiefer (2006)). Fre-
quently listed key reasons for ‘quantizing gravitation’ include, amongst ot-
hers, cosmological considerations, black hole evolution, theoretical problems
in QFT, and aiming at unification (cf. Kiefer (2006), Huggett and Callender
(2001b), Wu¨thrich (2005)). Many suspect that unification ideals are particu-
larly crucial (e.g. Mattingly (2005)), especially with respect to approaches in
the context of particle physics.
This is mainly based on the following: First of all, it seems that there is no
empirical need whatsoever to construct the theory. In fact, both theories (SM
and GR) are in perfect agreement with all available, and—concerning quan-
tum gravitational effects—presumably even all expectable data. The typical
energy (or length) scale where quantum gravitational effects are understood
to become relevant is roughly 16 orders of magnitude higher (smaller) than
presently available (e.g. Arkani-Hamed (2012)). So, one might argue that,
pragmatically, we cannot really hope for direct experimental data—it is by no
means excluded though and we particularly might hope for indirect indicati-
ons.3 Still, up to now, experiment does not suggest any need for modifications.
3Furthermore, actually suggestions are put forward for how theory assessment without
experimental data could work (Dawid, 2013)—a very interesting, but also highly controversial
project (cf. Rovelli (2016)).
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Second, skeptics add that also invoked theoretical arguments are in fact—
or in principle—not compelling (e.g. Mattingly (2005)). Finally, and proba-
bly most importantly, many share the conviction that GR and QFT are funda-
mentally incompatible for quite a simple reason: “according to GTR [general
relativity], gravity simply is not a force” like the electromagnetic, the weak,
and the strong interaction (Maudlin, 1996). This is not to say that GR and
quantum theory are incompatible in a logical sense, but to argue that they are
“incommensurable (families of) theories” (Wu¨thrich, 2005, 778).
In summary, there seems to be neither empirical ground, nor any genuine
physical reason to pursue the quest for QG. That is why some suspect that
internal strategies of physics alone (e.g. inductive generalization, expanding
the realm of an established theory or exploiting the explanatory capacities of
an established theory) cannot account for such programs. Instead, physicists
are said to employ external arguments, for example a ‘dogma of unification’
(Mattingly (2005); see also Maudlin (1996) and Wu¨thrich (2005, 2012)). In
this perspective, physicists would employ metaphysical principles (e.g. ‘unity
of nature’), metatheoretical principles (e.g. ‘economy of thought’) or episte-
mological principles (e.g. physicists pursue unification for its own sake—i.e.
the mere fact of the theory dualism itself is considered a defect of theoreti-
cal physics), that is philosophical reasons (Mattingly, 2005; Wu¨thrich, 2006,
2012). Against this I insist that a quantum theoretic account of gravity is al-
ready part of the well-known framework of QFT and that it prompts the quest
for QG.
Let me rephrase it as follows: Positions arguing that physics generally
aims at unification (or a minimal theoretical system or representing an assu-
med ‘unity of nature’) can neatly explain attempts at QG. But what about posi-
tions arguing that physics aims at empirical adequacy, for example? Are such
positions able to explain the quest for QG? Do physicists employ philosophi-
cal reasons, or can we understand the search for a theory of QG internally?
To answer this, let us first be clear where the objections against QG typically
arise: in the geometrization picture of gravity as the canonical interpretation
of GR.
3 The Canonical Picture of General Relativity
In the canonical formulation of GR already basic notions like ‘metric’ and
‘curvature’ seem to strongly suggest a reductionist view on gravitation. In
fact, the interpretation of GR as a reduction of gravitation to spacetime cur-
vature is often attributed to Einstein himself (Weinberg, 1972, vii, 147)—a
common misreading as Lehmkuhl (2014) insists. As a matter of fact, GR is
usually presented as a geometrization of gravity in textbooks:
General relativity (GR) is Einstein’s theory of space, time,
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and gravitation. At heart it is a very simple subject (compared,
for example, to anything involving quantum mechanics). The
essential idea is perfectly straightforward: while most forces of
nature are represented by fields defined on spacetime (such as
the electromagnetic field, or the short-range fields characteristic
of subnuclear forces), gravity is inherent in spacetime itself. In
particular, what we experience as “gravity” is a manifestation of
the curvature of spacetime. Our task, then, is clear. We need
to understand spacetime, we need to understand curvature, and
we need to understand how curvature becomes gravity. (Carroll,
2004, 1)
In this interpretation, gravity reveals as a geometrized pseudo force: Gravita-
tion is reduced to spacetime geometry and becomes a mere effect of the cur-
vature of spacetime. As we have seen, for example Maudlin (1996) advocates
this view. Undoubtedly, the textbook interpretation is very appealing. First,
it remains close to the mathematical formalism that successfully unifies two
apparently very different concepts: gravitation and spacetime geometry. Se-
cond, the textbook version yields quite transparent ontological commitments,
most importantly that spacetime is a Riemannian manifold, M , with a metric,
g, 4 and that gravitation is not an interaction (or ‘force’), but simply curvature
of spacetime. Altogether, this is a perfectly fine interpretation of GR.
But why adopt this interpretation? What underpins the geometrization
picture except the fact that the canonical formalism of GR contains the mat-
hematical objects mentioned above? To answer this, one needs to look at what
GR is based on conceptually: At the core of GR, and at the core of the geo-
metrization picture as well, we find Einstein’s principle of equivalence. Note
that the equivalence principle comes in different varieties. Essentially, there
is a weak and a strong version (e.g. Carroll (2004, 48–54)). The weak equiva-
lence principle (WEP) states that the inertial mass, mi, and the gravitational
mass, mg, of any object are equal in value. Remember the case of Newtonian
mechanics: Here, the inertial mass is the constant of proportionality between
some force and the acceleration of the object the force acts on. Since the value
of the inertial mass of the object is the same for any force, the inertial mass is
universal in character (Carroll, 2004, 48). On the other hand, the gravitational
mass is a specific quantity only related to the gravitational force—it is the con-
stant of proportionality between the gradient of the gravitational potential and
the gravitational force (Carroll, 2004, 48). Prima facie, both masses are con-
ceptually independent. Hence, mg/mi may differ for different objects and
may therefore be thought of as a ‘gravitational charge’ (Carroll, 2004, 48).
Accordingly, the behavior of different objects in a gravitational field would
generally depend on the (different) gravitational charges, just as the behavior
4Note that in light of the hole argument, the focus has shifted to the metric alone.
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of electromagnetically charged particles in an electromagnetic field depends
on the particles’ charges. However, since Galilei we empirically know that
inertial and gravitational mass are always equal in value, mi = mg. Every
object in a gravitational field falls at the same rate regardless of its proper-
ties including mass. Thus, in Newtonian mechanics inertial and gravitational
mass are conceptually different (or different in type), but empirically equal
in value. In this sense, gravitation is universal in Newtonian mechanics and
obeys the WEP (Carroll, 2004, 48f)—without explanation. The geometriza-
tion picture of GR, on the other hand, is able to provide an explanation for
the WEP by eliminating mg from the theory altogether as we will see in a
moment.
First, to better understand the geometrization rationale and to prepare for
the formulation of the strong equivalence principle (SEP) let us rephrase the
essence of the weak version in a famous thought experiment:
Imagine [. . . ] a physicist in a tightly sealed box, unable to
observe the outside world, who is doing experiments involving
the motion of test particles, for example to measure the local gra-
vitational field. Of course she would obtain different answers if
the box were sitting on the moon or on Jupiter than she would on
Earth. But the answers would also be different if the box were
accelerating at a constant velocity [. . . ] (Carroll, 2004, 49)
According to the WEP, it is impossible to decide whether the observed effects
on freely-falling test particles stem from a gravitational field or from being
situated in a uniformly accelerated frame. This is a result of the universality
of gravitation. As mentioned, for the electromagnetic field such an empiri-
cal distinction is possible: we would simply have to compare the behavior of
particles with different charge. Since for gravity the particle’s ‘gravitational
charge’ is universal, this does not work (Carroll, 2004, 49). Note that because
of possible inhomogeneities in the gravitational field this is only true for suf-
ficiently small frames, technically speaking: it is only true locally. We can
then formulate the WEP as follows:
The motion of freely-falling particles are the same in a gravi-
tational field and a uniformly accelerated frame, in small enough
regions of spacetime. (Carroll, 2004, 49)
Since special relativity (SR) tells us that ‘mass’ is a manifestation of energy
and momentum, the SEP generalizes the above statement:
In small enough regions of spacetime, the laws of physics
reduce to those of special relativity; it is impossible to detect
the existence of a gravitational field by means of local experi-
ments. (Carroll, 2004, 50)
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This means that locally we can always ‘transform away’ a gravitational field
and the laws reduce to the laws of SR.5 In this sense, gravity becomes a
‘pseudo force’: There is no such thing as a gravitational potential in GR.
Now, this is not to say that gravity is fictitious. Quite the contrary, it means
that gravity turns out to be inescapable: a ‘gravitationally neutral object’ with
respect to which we could measure the acceleration due to gravity does not
exist (Carroll, 2004, 50). Hence, every object in the universe carrying energy
and momentum is subject to gravity. In fact, every object is subject to gravity
in the same way. Gravity does not distinguish between different types of ob-
jects. All objects, regardless of their properties including mass, are attracted
universally (Carroll, 2004, 48).
It is exactly gravity’s universality that seems to strongly suggest a geo-
metrization picture of gravity. For gravitation essentially being curvature of
spacetime, being a feature of the Riemannian manifold (or the metric, re-
spectively), being a geometrical background structure perfectly explains why
the SEP should hold. If gravitation is curvature of spacetime, then it is ob-
vious why we can always perform local transformations so that gravitation
vanishes, why the laws of physics locally look like the laws of SR. It is then
also obvious why this should affect every single object in the universe in the
same way. The simple fact that gravitational effects are apparently indepen-
dent of the objects’ properties supports the claim that gravitation arises from
spacetime itself and that the notion of gravitational mass needs to be elimina-
ted.6 As a result, the SEP does not only play an important role for GR, but
also for the theory dualism in physics: A geometrization picture of gravity
seems fairly disconnected from how we understand the other fundamental in-
teractions (cf. Weinberg (1972, viii)). While gravitation is spacetime, the
other fundamental interactions are fields in spacetime.
However, this perspective on GR is not exclusive. Lehmkuhl (2008) ar-
gues that interpretations within the canonical formalism are not committed to
the geometrization thesis that gravitation is reduced to spacetime geometry.
Clearly, GR associates gravitation with spacetime, but the type of association
is not fixed (Lehmkuhl, 2008, 84). Besides the geometrical interpretation,
one may as well put forward the field interpretation or the egalitarian inter-
pretation. The former claims that—contrary to the geometrization picture—
spacetime geometry is reduced to a gravitational field, i.e. the metric, which is
taken as ‘just another field’. Instead, in its strongest version, the latter argues
for a conceptual identification of gravity and spacetime in GR (Lehmkuhl,
5Note that Carroll’s definition of the SEP is not very precise. Read et al. (2017) carefully
distinguish and discuss four versions of the SEP.
6While Newtonian physics was unable to provide an explanation for why the equivalence
principle should hold, the geometrical picture of GR provides an explanation in terms of an
elimination (of gravitational potential and gravitational mass). As we will see in a moment, it
is also possible to give a reductive account.
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2008, 84). Such alternative interpretations seem to reduce the conceptual
differences between GR and the other field theories and may be further sup-
ported by gauge theoretic formulations of classical GR in the so-called tetrad
or vielbein formalism (e.g. Carroll (2004, 483–494). Also, Brown famously
argues for a dynamical perspective (cf. Brown (2005); Brown and Pooley
(2001, 2006); Brown and Read (2016)) that may be viewed as a variant of the
field interpretation.
But these responses do not close the (technical) gaps between both frame-
works, GR and QFT. Vague formal similarities between theories cannot be
considered a substantial and physical reason for unification. Just think of the
case of Newton’s law of gravitation and Coulomb’s law of electricity: The
fact that both laws exhibit the exact same mathematical form does by no me-
ans imply that the phenomena of gravitation and electricity are linked in any
substantial sense. Accordingly, one might still suspect that for explaining uni-
ficatory approaches like QG we need to impose additional external principles
guiding physics.
However, concerning an argumentation against the geometrization picture
in favor of a unified perspective another approach appears to be much more
relevant: Weinberg (1964a, 1965b, 1995) and others—for example Feynman
(1995), and more recently Donoghue (1994, 2014)—advocated a “nongeome-
trical” (Weinberg, 1972, viii) understanding of GR based on QFT. But let us
not get ahead of ourselves and slowly approach the matter by help of Wein-
berg himself.
4 Weinberg’s Conception of General Relativity
Weinberg is very clear in expressing his opposition to the geometrical under-
standing of GR:
In learning general relativity, and then in teaching it to classes
at Berkeley and M.I.T., I became dissatisfied with what seemed
to be the usual approach to the subject. I found that in most
textbooks geometric ideas were given a starring role, so that a
student who asked why the gravitational field is represented by a
metric tensor, or why freely falling particles move on geodesics,
or why the field equations are generally covariant would come
away with an impression that this had something to do with the
fact that space-time is a Riemannian manifold. (Weinberg, 1972,
vii)
Furthermore, Weinberg considers the geometrization picture as historically
contingent:
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It is certainly a historical fact that when Albert Einstein was
working out general relativity, there was at hand a preexisting
mathematical formalism, that of Riemannian geometry, that he
could and did take over whole. However, this historical fact does
not mean that the essence of general relativity necessarily con-
sists in the application of Riemannian geometry to physical space
and time. (Weinberg, 1972, 3)
Weinberg argues that the geometrization picture ultimately confuses ‘repre-
sentation’ and ‘represented’. He suggests to conceive Riemannian geometry
merely as a mathematical tool to account for “the peculiar empirical proper-
ties of gravitation, properties summarized by Einstein’s Principle of Equiva-
lence of Gravitation and Inertia” (Weinberg, 1972, vii–viii, 3). The tool of
Riemannian geometry should not be confused with the physical content of
the principle of equivalence:
In place of Riemannian geometry, I have based the discussion
of general relativity on a principle derived from experiment: the
Principle of the Equivalence of Gravitation and Inertia. [. . . ] so
that Riemannian geometry appears only as a mathematical tool
for the exploitation of the Principle of Equivalence, and not as a
fundamental basis for the theory of gravitation. (Weinberg, 1972,
viii)
According to Weinberg, Riemannian geometry is one possibility to represent
the physical essence of GR, i.e. the SEP. But there are others as well. Wein-
berg puts forward an attitude that may be summarized as: “Don’t look at the
formalism, look at the physics!” However, after withdrawing the natural in-
corporation of the SEP via the usual foundation of GR in spacetime geometry,
Weinberg then needs to come up with a proposal why gravitation should obey
the SEP:
This approach naturally leads us to ask why gravitation should
obey the Principle of Equivalence. (Weinberg, 1972, viii)
Interestingly, Weinberg does not expect to find an answer within the general
framework of classical physics or within GR. Instead, Weinberg argues that
one has to consider “the constraints imposed by the quantum theory of gravi-
tation” (Weinberg, 1972, viii). In the course of the following section, we will
see what this means and how this reasoning can be spelled out.
5 Deriving the Principle of Equivalence
As we have seen, in the canonical interpretation of GR the SEP proves to be
essential for describing the phenomenon of gravitation and for interpreting it
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as curvature of spacetime. Hence, it is for the SEP that gravity appears to
be completely separated from the rest of fundamental physics. Accordingly,
especially attempts at QG in the framework of particle physics seem to rest
purely on philosophical considerations pursuing unification based on external
principles. However, in the following, we will find that the SEP can be re-
covered in a quantum field theoretic framework. As a result, the SEP turns
out to be the link between our theory of gravitation and particle physics. The
unificatory practice of physics proves to proceed internally, based on genuine
strategies of physics alone.
Essentially, the reconstruction of the equivalence principle according to
Weinberg (1964a,b, 1965a,b, 1995, 1999) is done in three steps: First, it is
argued that starting from SR and QM as ‘first principles’ we arrive at QFT
(e.g. Weinberg (1999) and Arkani-Hamed (2013)). Second, while particles
may in general have any spin in QFT, it turns out that in the low-energy limit
(or ‘long-range limit’)7 QFT provides a restrictive framework that only allows
for fundamental particles with very specific spins—in the long-range limit we
can only have particles with spin 0, 1/2, 1, 3/2, or 2. Third, analyzing this
menu it can be shown that Lorentz invariant interactions with massless spin-2
particles require the equivalence principle to hold. So it turns out that the
equivalence principle is not a fundamental principle itself, but can be deri-
ved from SR and QM. Actually, one can even prove that GR can be fully
reconstructed in this approach as the only possible theory of gravitation at
low energies (e.g. Arkani-Hamed (2010b)).
Now, we will not be able to demonstrate and appreciate all steps of the ar-
gumentation here. Instead, I will focus on a (as far as possible) non-technical
presentation of step three. To set the stage, I will very briefly review some
basics. To get accustomed to Weinberg’s rationale, we will then—as a warm-
up—consider what constraint Lorentz-invariance imposes on interactions with
spin-1 particles, i.e. photons, in the low-energy regime: low-energetic pho-
tons may only participate in interactions that conserve charge. Afterwards,
we will discuss the spin-2 case and show how Weinberg is able to recover the
WEP and implicitly also the SEP within QFT.
In principle, there are several ways to do so. Weinberg first formulated
the argument in the context of S-matrix-theory (Weinberg, 1964a,b, 1965a,b).
The following presentation rests on Weinberg’s original work, on his text-
book on QFT (Weinberg, 1995, 534–539), an illuminating lecture by Arkani-
Hamed (Arkani-Hamed, 2010b), and lecture notes by Nicolis (Nicolis, 2011).
To motivate what follows, recall that QFT can be understood as a theory
of particles.8 In general, quantum particles have the following essential pro-
7Here, ‘low energy’ means low energy with respect to the so-called Planck energy. Even
the highest presently available energy scales in physics can safely be considered ‘low’ in that
sense.
8Of course, quantum field theory can be thought to be, first and foremost, a theory of
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perties: mass, charge, and spin. Still, particles may have zero mass, carry
no charge, or have spin-0. In QFT, particles divide into fermions or matter
particles with half-integer spin, and bosons with integer spin. Furthermore,
particles can interact with each other. The interactions of the Standard Model
are represented by the exchange of certain mediator particles, so-called gauge
bosons with spin-1. For example, the electromagnetic interaction between
two electrons is understood as an exchange of a massless spin-1 particle, the
photon. The fact that it does not carry electromagnetic charge itself tells us
that there is no self-interaction, its zero mass accounts for electromagnetism
being a long-range interaction, and its odd spin incorporates that like charges
repel. Accordingly, a hypothetical mediator particle for gravity, usually refer-
red to as the graviton, is required to be massless as well, but to have even spin
to account for the fact that gravity is attractive.
For the interaction processes of such particles, we can calculate so-called
transition amplitudes to determine the ‘cross section’ or probability of the
process. To calculate such amplitudes, we need to specify certain parameters.
That is, most importantly, the strength of the specific interaction, the so-called
coupling strength, and the masses, charges and spins of the participating parti-
cles. If two particles do not ‘couple’, the respective interaction is not allowed
to take place.
Now, Weinberg’s argument takes its departure from calculating such am-
plitudes of scattering processes in QFT. As Fig. 5.1a shows, in a scattering
process a bunch of particles come in, interact in some way, and then a bunch
of particles (the same particles or others) go out again. For any such process
we can write down an amplitude, for example using the so-called Feynman
rules which can be read off the corresponding Lagrangian. However, for our
purpose it is not even necessary to write down the full scattering amplitude.
We are not interested in the details of the scattering process or any specifi-
cation of its interactions. Therefore, we represent the full scattering process,
i.e. the sum of all possible Feynman diagrams for the process α → β, by
the sphere in Fig. 5.1a. What we are actually interested in, is, without loss
of generality, the analysis of a slight modification of such a generic scatte-
ring process (see Fig. 5.1b) to see if and how the corresponding interaction is
constrained.
So, assume we know the amplitude,Mαβ(p1, . . . , pn), for some arbitrary
scattering process as in Fig. 5.1a. We would like to know the amplitude for
the exact same process where additionally a soft massless particle with mo-
mentum q is emitted from one of the in- or outgoing particles (cf. Fig. 5.1b).
Here, ‘soft’ means that the particle has very low energy—that is vanishing
fields. The corresponding particles are then derivative of the fields in the sense that they
are excitations of the fields. Nevertheless, as the term particle physics stresses, we can also
perceive it as a theory of particles. However, by talking about particles instead of fields I do
not mean to have claimed anything substantial about the nature of QFT.
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Figure 5.1: a. Arbitrary scattering process α→ β (modification of Weinberg
(1995, 536)). b. Dominant diagram for additional emission of soft photons or
gravitons from an outgoing particle in an arbitrary scattering process (Wein-
berg, 1995, 536).
momentum, q → 0. For example, the additionally emitted particle could be
a photon. Note that in general the emitted particle may have any spin. We
will now analyze the emission process for the photon case and learn about
properties and constraints in the long-range limit. Specifically, we will ex-
plore the consequences of Lorentz-invariance for massless particles of spin-1.
To mathematically account for the additional emission process, we have to
multiply the original amplitude by a non-trivial factor. Because we want to
model long-range phenomena, we shall only consider the most leading possi-
ble contribution that will survive ‘at infinity’, that is in the long-range limit.
Generally, this factor will depend on the polarization vector of the photon,
µ(q), the momentum of the photon, q, all the momenta of the other particles,
pi, and their charges, ei.9 Accordingly, we obtain the following amplitude for
the slightly modified process of Fig. 5.1b (Arkani-Hamed, 2010b):
Mαβ(p1, . . . , pn, q)|q→0 =Mαβ(p1, . . . , pn)×
∑
i
ei
pµi
2pi · q µ(q) . (5.1)
However, the emission factor in the amplitude is not completely arbitrary.
The additional emission of a soft photon should not spoil Lorentz-invariance.
Thus, we demand that Lorentz-invariance is preserved.10 As a result, Eq.
(5.1) is required to become zero for µ(q) → qµ. Since the original ampli-
tude,Mαβ(p1, . . . , pn), is assumed to be non-zero (the original process is not
9Here, the charge of a particle is defined as its coupling constant for emission of soft pho-
tons (Weinberg, 1965b, B989)
10That means that we demand the polarization vector to transform as µ(p)→ (Λ)µ(p) +
α(Λp)µ.
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forbidden), the emission factor itself has to vanish:∑
i
ei
qµpi,µ
2pi · q = 0 . (5.2)
Accordingly, we arrive at the fact that the sum over all charges needs to be
zero,
∑
i ei = 0, which means that the process is forced to obey charge con-
servation. So, interactions with soft massless spin-1 particles always conserve
the respective charges. One could go on and derive Maxwell’s equations by
using perturbation theory (Weinberg, 1965b), but we will stop here and turn
to the next and more interesting case instead: a massless spin-2 particle, com-
monly referred to as the graviton.
As mentioned, such a spin-2 particle is among the quantum field theoreti-
cally allowed particles in the long-range limit. We can now essentially follow
the same argumentation. Again, we want to investigate the long-range beha-
vior, so we write down the leading contribution for our emission factor in the
case of a soft graviton (Arkani-Hamed, 2010b):
Mαβ(p1, . . . , pn, q)|q→0 =Mαβ(p1, . . . , pn)×
∑
i
κi
pµi p
ν
i
2pi · q µν(q) . (5.3)
Here, µν(q) is the polarization tensor of the graviton, and κi are the coupling
constants for the particles with momenta pi emitting a soft graviton (Wein-
berg, 1965b, B989). Now, if we demand Lorentz-invariance (and again as-
sume that the original process is allowed, i.e. Mαβ(p1, . . . , pn) 6= 0), we
arrive at: ∑
i
κip
ν
i = 0 . (5.4)
So, what does this mean? According to Eq. (5.4) the sum over all momenta,
pi, weighted by the coupling constants, κi, is required to be conserved in all
possible scattering processes. However, we know that already (unweighted)
momentum conservation,
∑
i pi = 0, should hold in all scattering processes.
If both, momentum conservation and Eq. (5.4), are supposed to hold, there are
only two options: Either the scattering between the particles of momentum
pi is trivial, that means the particles do not interact at all, or all coupling
constants, κi, have to be identical for all particle species regardless of their
properties, that is κi = κ.
So, by demanding Lorentz-invariance the coupling of a massless spin-2
particle to any other particle (including other spin-2 particles) is forced to
be universal. This is precisely the quantum field theoretic version of the
weak equivalence principle that gravitation is supposed to obey.11 Hence,
11Here we used a slight simplification, but for example Nicolis (2011) carefully proves that
the gravitational coupling constants, κi, are indeed forced to be universal.
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the WEP is established within QFT. Note that for obtaining the strong equiva-
lence principle the coupling is usually also required to be minimal (cf. Read
et al. (2017)). This is fulfilled here because all terms violating the SEP es-
sentially behave as high-energy corrections and are therefore absent in the
low-energy limit. In this sense, the WEP effectively implies the SEP.12
To further appreciate this result, one can also prove that the massless
spin-2 particle is unique. There can only be exactly one massless spin-2
field (Arkani-Hamed, 2010b). Also, we can show that for higher spins all
respective coupling constants must vanish in the long-range limit, so there are
no Lorentz invariant theories of massless particles with spins higher than spin-
2 (Weinberg, 1965b, B989). In conclusion, we find that the massless spin-2
particle uniquely represents an attractive long-range interaction that univer-
sally couples to all forms of energy and momenta. Also self-interaction, anot-
her important property of gravitation, is automatically established (Weinberg,
1964a). The massless spin-2 particle is therefore correctly called ‘graviton’.
Before I comment on what follows regarding unification, let me first briefly
summarize what follows regarding the relation between GR and QFT.
6 What Do We Learn from This?
In the light of Weinberg’s argument, the equivalence principle, usually percei-
ved in close connection with the geometrization thesis, turns out to be the link
between a theory of gravitation and particle physics. The low-energy limit of
our empirically best tested and theoretically most advanced framework, na-
mely QFT, proves to be highly constraining (Arkani-Hamed, 2010a,b, 2013).
In the low-energy limit it is impossible to construct a Lorentz invariant quan-
tum theory for massless spin-2 particles that does not obey the SEP:
In other words, by asking for a theory of a spin-2 field cou-
pling to the energy-momentum tensor, we end up with the fully
nonlinear glory of general relativity. (Carroll, 2004, 299)
The equivalence principle is not merely postulated, but explained. In QFT the
SEP is “not a principle, but a theorem” (Nicolis, 2011, 28). The fundamental
principles of locality (SR) and unitarity (QM) that ground QFT enforce the
SEP to hold, they enforce a theory of gravitation (Weinberg, 1999; Arkani-
Hamed, 2013). Hence, a reductive account of GR is obtained: GR can be
deduced from QFT. In terms of principles, GR can be deduced from bringing
together SR and QM:
12Still, given that Read et al. (2017) argue that minimal coupling may violate certain versi-
ons of the SEP, there definitely remains more to be said. Ultimately, all claims involving the
SEP here are in need of further clarification.
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All of these things that Einstein did—Einstein thought about
these falling elevators and he discovered the Principle of Equiva-
lence and all these deep facts about classical physics that led him
to think about General Relativity—all of those things could have
been discovered by much more mediocre theoretical physicists
who knew about Quantum Mechanics. (Arkani-Hamed, 2013)
Typically, the conviction is that GR is more fundamental than SR. But accor-
ding to the analysis above, it is in fact the other way around.
However, there is a well-known caveat that we have to mention. Wein-
berg’s approach is only able to consistently account for a theory of gravitation
at low energies. At high energies the theory is rendered non-predictive. That
is the infamous problem of gravity’s nonrenormalizability (Weinberg, 1972,
289). Due to this QFT is not able to provide a full-fledged theory of quan-
tum gravity. But—and this should be appreciated—the spin-2 approach is
an existing quantum theory of gravitation encompassing all presently known
experimental data:
A lot of portentous drivel has been written about the quan-
tum theory of gravity, so I’d like to begin by making a funda-
mental observation about it that tends to be obfuscated. There
is a perfectly well-defined quantum theory of gravity that agrees
accurately with all available experimental data. (Wilczek, 2002)
So, we learn how to adequately understand and formulate the actual problem
with QG. Usually, it is presented somehow like this: ‘Combining GR and
QM leads to a meaningless theory.’, or ‘We don’t know how to combine QM
as a theory of the very small and GR as a theory of the very big.’, or as
Wu¨thrich (2005, 782) states it: “In a sense, then, quantum mechanics and
general relativity when combined already contain the seeds of their own de-
struction.” In the light of Weinberg’s argument, these statements prove false
or at least misleading. First of all, the problem with QG is not that we have
no grounds whatsoever to talk about such a theory—we actually already have
one. Instead, the problem is that this theory is not valid at high energies.
Accordingly, solving the problem amounts to finding the correct high energy
theory (cf. Donoghue (2014)). Thus, the problem with finding a (full-fledged)
theory of QG is more subtle than often described.
Moreover, as discussed above, the problem is not constituted by bringing
together GR and QM, but by bringing together SR and QM, since QFT is
solely based on these two theories and the assumption of the cluster decom-
position principle (cf. Weinberg (1999)). As a consequence, we can infer that
it is SR and QM that exhibit a very subtle conflict at high energies.13
13According to Maudlin (2011), there is another, very general conflict between SR and QM
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7 Critical Remarks
There are some objections against this presentation. I will not be able to ad-
dress them in detail, but they should at least be mentioned. Since I will only
sketch responses, there certainly remains more to be said as the topics are
fairly complex. First of all, one may be skeptical if the recovered result in
Weinberg’s argumentation really needs to be identified with Einstein’s princi-
ple of equivalence because many general relativists would typically not state it
in terms of ‘universal coupling’ (plus minimal coupling). This is an issue that
needs to be addressed and investigated further—a task that I have to postpone.
However, it would seem dubious if we should not be allowed to translate
a physical concept from one theoretical framework to another as a matter of
principle. Such translations will in general involve non-trivial reinterpreta-
tions of the respective structures—business as usual in physics during theo-
retical progress. And, certainly, this may result in considerable deviations,
but that does not necessarily undermine the new perspectives significance. In
fact, I would rather suggest to read it as follows: By means of this practice,
we learn something about how modern physics addresses the notion of funda-
mentality. In recovering and reinterpreting an established fundamental struc-
ture like the SEP within another framework, we obtain another perspective
and learn more about the essential aspects of the structure. For example, the
structure may reveal as nonfundamental. In this sense, physics continuously
challenges alleged fundamentality of structures—again this needs to be inves-
tigated further.
Second, the issue of nonrenormalizability is certainly very important and
constitutes the main objection against quantum field theoretic approaches.
Still, as we have seen, this approach turns out to be quite illuminating. Also,
the fact that such approaches are nonrenormalizable is not straightforwardly
problematic in the light of effective theories (Donoghue, 1994). Still, one has
to clarify whether being an effective field theory is a serious defect in general
as some do suspect (Redhead, 1999). Keep in mind, however, that also clas-
sical GR is effective in that it does not contain higher powers of the curvature
tensor.
Finally, another frequent complaint against quantum field theoretic appro-
aches to QG concerns the issue of background independence (e.g. Huggett
and Callender (2001b); Rickles and French (2006)). Especially general re-
lativists (and many philosophers) assume that background independence con-
stitutes the other key feature of GR besides Einstein’s equivalence principle.
due to Bell’s theorem. Note, however, that this is an entirely different issue closely connected
to the debate on the interpretation of QM—a debate which physicists might be safe to ignore
as long as the theory is empirically adequate. The high energy conflict mentioned here is not of
that kind: While QFT is empirically adequate, consistent and highly predictive at low energies,
it becomes non-predictive at high energies.
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It is typically understood to render GR fully dynamical. On the contrary, ap-
proaches in the context of QFT simply employ the Minkowski metric. Thus,
QFT is argued to be background dependent.
However, first of all, background independence is a very loose concept. It
already proves highly difficult to define what background independence pre-
cisely means (Belot, 2011; Read, 2016). Second, background independence
may already be destroyed in classical GR (Belot, 2011). For instance, a non-
empty universe that contains matter and electromagnetic fields is not fully
background independent (Belot, 2011). To appreciate this result, remember
that Weinberg’s approach already includes matter and all interactions. On the
contrary, approaches that start from GR and value background independence
are typically concerned with spacetime alone. I suspect that praising back-
ground independence is closely tied to contestable philosophical premises.
8 Unification Revisited
Finally, what about the suspected ‘dogma of unification’? I suggest to take
the presented argumentation as an example for physics’ internal capacity to
promote theoretical progress by fully exploiting an existing theoretical fra-
mework and thereby uncovering substantial links to allegedly disconnected
phenomena and theoretical structures.
Weinberg’s quantum field theoretic derivation of the equivalence principle
bridges the gulf between seemingly isolated theories. It should be emphasized
that this perspective evolves internally. On its own, QFT provides a quantum
theory of gravitation and—though this is not the final answer—resources to
investigate and evaluate its flaws. As a result, we do not need to refer to
any external principle to account for Weinberg’s approach or to explain the
quest for QG. The research program does not rely on external principles and
does not commit to or execute a ‘dogma of unification’. Hence, the situation
is not special at all compared to previous endeavours in theoretical physics.
To obtain a quantum theory of gravitation, Weinberg and others only had to
take the best theoretical framework, namely QFT, seriously and analyze it
thoroughly.
However, applying the same methods further and expanding the theory’s
realm to higher energies unfolds that QFT itself has its problems: As menti-
oned, Weinberg’s spin-2 approach is nonrenormalizable. It does not provide
meaningful, i.e. finite, results at high energies. According to particle physics,
this is the issue of QG.
To solve this problem, one could generally proceed by either dismissing
the theory as a whole (or at least one of its basic principles) and start from
scratch, or try to dissolve the anomalies while keeping the basic principles
(cf. Arkani-Hamed (2013)). As argued in Section 6, the problem with con-
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structing a full-fledged theory of QG arises from bringing together QM and
SR at high energies. The core principles by which we were able to construct
our most accurate theoretical framework prove in tension in an even more
fundamental way. In this view, a full-fledged theory of QG may result as a
by-product of better understanding QFT (which again is a completely internal
endeavour of physics).
Furthermore, if approaches to QG do not rely on external principles, but
turn out to be a mere by-product of physical research applying its internal
methods, it seems that the objections, doubts, and worries raised against these
approaches become less persuasive. The theory itself tells us that there is
more to come.
The presented argumentation was concerned with Weinberg’s approach
only. What about other takes on QG? Do they also solely rely on internal
principles or are external principles involved? One would have to investigate
their practice, too. But let me add the following: By help of Weinberg’s ap-
proach we saw that QFT is already able to incorporate gravity. In fact, we
saw that GR can be reduced to QFT. That does not seem to be the case the
other way around. The classical framework of GR does not provide links
to particle physics. It seems to be a perfectly consistent and self-contained
theory. Also arguments concerning singularities do neither prove GR incon-
sistent, nor do they hint at a quantum theory of gravity (Wu¨thrich, 2012, 2).
In the light of the presented argumentation, this should come as no surprise,
since GR is a classical theory deduced from QFT. As a result, one may argue
that it somehow seems odd to start approaches to QG from GR (cf. Weinberg
(1999)).
References
Arkani-Hamed, N. (2010a), ‘The Future of Fundamental Physics. Space-Time
is Doomed; What Replaces It?’, Messenger Lecture Series at Cornell Uni-
versity. Lecture.
Arkani-Hamed, N. (2010b), ‘Robustness of GR. Attempts to Modify Gravity.
Part I’, Prospects in Theoretical Physics Program, Cornell University. Lec-
ture.
Arkani-Hamed, N. (2012), ‘The Future of Fundamental Physics’, Dædalus
141(3), 53–66.
Arkani-Hamed, N. (2013), ‘Philosophy of Fundamental Physics’, Andrew D.
White Professors-at-Large Program. Cornell University. Lecture.
Belot, G. (2011), ‘Background-independence’, Gen. Relativ. Gravit. 43(10),
2865–2884. arXiv:grqc/1106.0920.
Brown, H. (2005), Physical Relativity: Spacetime Structure from a Dynamical
Perspective, Oxford University Press.
Brown, H. R. and Pooley, O. (2001), ‘The origins of the spacetime me-
tric: Bell’s ‘Lorentzian pedagogy’ and its significance in general relativity.’
18
In: C. Callender and N. Huggett (Eds.), Physics Meets Philosophy at the
Planck Scale, Cambridge University Press, 256–272.
Brown, H. R. and Pooley, O. (2006), ‘Minkowski space-time: A glorious non-
entity.’ In: D. Dieks (Ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime, Vol. 1 of Philosophy
and Foundations of Physics, Elsevier, 6789.
Brown, H. R. and Read, J. (2016), ‘Clarifying possible misconceptions in the
foundations of general relativity’, Amercian Journal of Physics 84, 327.
Carlip, S. (2008), ‘Is quantum gravity necessary?’, Class. Quantum Grav. 25,
154010.
Carroll, S. (2004), Spacetime and Geometry. An Introduction to General Re-
lativity, Addison Wesley.
Dawid, R. (2013), String Theory and the Scientific Method, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Donoghue, J. (1994), ‘General Relativity as an Effective Field Theory. The
Leading Quantum Corrections’, Physical Review D 59, 38743888.
Donoghue, J. (2014), ‘General relativity as an effective field theory’.
PSI Summer School ‘More than Higgs – Effective Theories for Parti-
cle Physics’. Zuoz. Lecture. blogs.umass.edu/donoghue/files/
2009/06/Zuoz-3.pdf.
Eppley, K. and Hannah, E. (1977), ‘The necessity of quantizing the gravitati-
onal field’, Foundations of Physics 7, 5168.
Feynman, R. and Morinigo, F. B. and Wagner, W. G. and Hatfield, B. (1995),
Feynman Lectures on Gravitation, Addison-Wesley.
Huggett, N. and Callender, C. (2001a), ‘Introduction’. In: N. Huggett and C.
Callender (Eds.), Physics meets philosophy at the Planck scale. Contempo-
rary theories in quantum gravity, Cambridge University Press, 133.
Huggett, N. and Callender, C. (2001b), ‘Why quantize gravity (or any other
field for that matter)?’, Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings), S382S394.
Kiefer, C. (2006), ‘Quantum Gravity: General Introduction and Recent Deve-
lopments’, Ann. Phys. 15(12), 129148.
Kiefer, C. (2007), Quantum Gravity, Oxford University Press.
Lehmkuhl, D. (2008), ‘Is spacetime a gravitational field?’. In: D. Dieks and
M. Redei (Eds.), Philosophy and Foundations of Physics Vol. 4: The Onto-
logy of Spacetime Vol. II, Elsevier, 83–110.
Lehmkuhl, D. (2014), ‘Why Einstein did not believe that General Relativity
geometrizes gravity’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46, Part B, 316326.
Mattingly, J. (2005), ‘Is Quantum Gravity Necessary?’, In: A. J. Kox and J.
Eisenstaedt (Eds.), The Universe of General Relativity, Birkha¨user, 327–
338. Talk at the 5th International Conference on the History and Foundati-
ons of General Relativity in 1999.
Mattingly, J. (2006), ‘Why Eppley and Hannah’s thought experiment fails’,
Phys. Rev. D 73, 064025.
19
Maudlin, T. (1996), ‘On the Unification of Physics’, The Journal of Phi-
losophy 93(3), 129–144.
Maudlin, T. (2011), Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity, Wiley-Blackwell.
Nicolis, A. (2011), ‘General Relativity from Lorentz Invariance’. Lecture no-
tes. phys.columbia.edu/˜nicolis/GR_from_LI_2.pdf.
Read, J. (2016), Background Independence in Classical and Quantum Gra-
vity, University of Oxford. B.Phil. Thesis.
Read, J. and Brown, H. R. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2017), ‘Two Miracles of Gene-
ral Relativity’. Manuscript in preparation.
Redhead, M. (1999), ‘Quantum Field Theory and the Philosopher’. In: T. Y.
Cao (Ed.), Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Field Theory, Cambridge
University Press, 34–40.
Rickles, D. and French, S. (2006), ‘Quantum Gravity Meets Structuralism:
Interweaving Relations in the Foundations of Physics’. In: D. Rickles, S.
French and J. Saatsi (Eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gra-
vity, Oxford University Press, 1–39.
Rovelli, C. (2016), ‘The dangers of non-empirical confirmation’.
arXiv:1609.01966.
Wald, R. M. (1984), General Relativity, The University of Chicago Press.
Weinberg, S. (1964a), ‘Derivation of Gauge Invariance and the Equivalence
Principle from Lorentz Invariance of the S-Matrix’, Physics Letters 9(4),
357–359.
Weinberg, S. (1964b), ‘Photons and Gravitons in S-Matrix Theory: Deri-
vation of Charge Conservation and Equality of Gravitational and Inertial
Mass’, Physics Review 135(4B), B1049–B1056.
Weinberg, S. (1965a), ‘Infrared Photons and Gravitons’, Physics Review 140
(2B), B516–B524.
Weinberg, S. (1965b), ‘Photons and Gravitons in Perturbation Theory: Deri-
vation of Maxwell’s and Einstein’s Equations’, Physics Review 138(4B),
B988–B1002.
Weinberg, S. (1972), Gravitation and Cosmology: Principles and Applicati-
ons of the General Theory of Relativity, Wiley.
Weinberg, S. (1995), The Quantum Theory of Fields. Volume I: Foundations,
Cambridge University Press.
Weinberg, S. (1999), ‘What Is Quantum Field Theory, and What Did We
Think It Is?’. In: T. Y. Cao (Ed.), Conceptual Foundations of Quantum
Field Theory, Cambridge University Press, 241–251.
Wu¨thrich, C. (2005), ‘To Quantize or Not to Quantize. Fact and Folklore in
Quantum Gravity’, Philosophy of Science 72, 777–788.
Wu¨thrich, C. (2006), Approaching the Planck Scale from a Generally Relati-
vistic Point of View: A Philosophical Appraisal of Loop Quantum Gravity,
University of Pittsburgh. PhD Thesis.
Wu¨thrich, C. (2012), ‘In search of lost spacetime: philosophical issues arising
20
in quantum gravity’, In: S. Le Bihan (Ed.), La philosophie de la physique:
d’aujourd’hui a` demain, Vuibert. arXiv:1207.1489v1.
Wilczek, F. (2002), ‘Scaling Mount Planck III: Is That All There Is?’, Physics
Today.
21
